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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-4555 
___________ 
 
MANINDER SINGH, 
 
     Petitioner 
v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
     Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A095-584-628) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Andrew R. Arthur 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 1, 2013 
 
Before: RENDELL, CHAGARES and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed August 7, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
2 
 
 Maninder Singh petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’s 
(“BIA”) denial of his request to reopen his removal proceedings.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will deny the petition. 
 
I. 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, we discuss the background of this case 
only briefly.  Singh, a native and citizen of India, entered the United States in 2002.  
Later that year, he filed an asylum application.  In 2006, the Department of Homeland 
Security initiated removal proceedings against him, charging him with being removable 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) for having entered the United States without 
being admitted or paroled.  Singh conceded his removability and requested asylum, 
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), 
claiming that he had been persecuted in India on account of his Sikh religion, his 
membership in the All India Sikh Student Federation, and his actual or imputed political 
opinions.   
 In January 2010, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied Singh’s requests for relief, 
citing several different grounds for that denial.  After the BIA upheld the IJ’s decision on 
appeal in May 2010, Singh filed a petition for review in this Court.  In June 2011, we 
denied that petition.  See Singh v. Att’y Gen., 433 F. App’x 63, 68 (3d Cir. 2011).  In 
doing so, we concluded, inter alia, that substantial evidence supported the agency’s 
determination that, due to changed country conditions in India, Singh lacked a well-
founded fear of future persecution.  Id. at 67.   
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 In July 2012, Singh filed a motion with the BIA, requesting both reopening of his 
removal proceedings and reconsideration of the BIA’s decision.  Singh, principally 
relying on affidavits from family members living in India, alleged that, in June 2010, 
December 2010, and March 2012, respectively, police officers in India went to his 
family’s home looking for him.  On the first such occasion, the officers allegedly 
threatened that if they found him they would kill him.  On the second and third occasions, 
they allegedly arrested Singh’s father, beat him, and released him only after receiving a 
bribe. 
 In November 2012, the BIA denied Singh’s motion.  The BIA concluded that, 
because Singh “ha[d] not submitted any objective evidence to establish the context for his 
claim that he would be subjected to persecution as a Sikh in India,” he had “failed to meet 
the heavy burden of demonstrating that the new evidence proffered with the motion 
would likely change the result in this case.”  (J.A. at 3 (citing Matter of Coelho, 20 I. & 
N. Dec. 464 (BIA 1992).)  The BIA also concluded that sua sponte reopening was not 
warranted, and that Singh’s request for reconsideration of its prior decision was untimely. 
 Singh now petitions for review of the BIA’s November 2012 decision. 
II. 
 Our review here is limited, for Singh has waived any challenge to the BIA’s denial 
of sua sponte reopening and the BIA’s denial of his request for reconsideration of its 
prior decision.  See Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 
26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994) (“An issue is waived unless a party raises it in [his] 
opening brief, and for those purposes a passing reference to an issue will not suffice to 
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bring that issue before this court.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).1  We 
have jurisdiction to review the remaining part of the BIA’s November 2012 decision — 
its denial of Singh’s request for reopening — pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  We 
review that denial for abuse of discretion, see Shardar v. Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 311 
(3d Cir. 2007), and may not disturb it unless it is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to 
law.”  Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 Having carefully reviewed the record, we cannot conclude that the BIA abused its 
discretion in denying Singh’s request to reopen.  Although his family’s alleged 
encounters with the police in India are troubling, it is unclear whether the police’s alleged 
interest in Singh is on account of a ground protected under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act.
2
  Indeed, none of the four affidavits from his family members makes 
clear why the police have allegedly been looking for him.  Granted, the affidavit from his 
grandfather does briefly state, “I am sure that the police will kill him, because the police 
kills young [S]ikhs very quickly as soon as [it] find[s] them.”  (J.A. at 40.)  But that 
averment appears to be nothing more than speculation, and it does not address why the 
police were allegedly looking for Singh on the three occasions in question.  Accordingly, 
we find no error in the BIA’s determination that Singh failed to “establish the context” 
for his claim that he would be persecuted in India on account of his being a Sikh, and that 
                                              
1
 Even if Singh had not waived the issue of sua sponte reopening, we would still lack 
jurisdiction to consider it.  See Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 159 (3d Cir. 2011).  
2
 Although relief under the CAT is not contingent upon an alien’s suffering torture on 
account of a particular ground, Ambartsoumian v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 
2004), Singh has failed to demonstrate that the BIA abused its discretion by not 
reopening his removal proceedings to allow him to further pursue CAT relief. 
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he had not met his “heavy burden” of showing that his new evidence would likely change 
the result in his case.  See Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 472-73. 
 In light of the above, we will deny Singh’s petition for review.3 
                                              
3
 We have considered the various arguments raised in Singh’s brief and conclude that 
none justifies disturbing the BIA’s denial of reopening. 
